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- ISAAC DEUTSCHER
- PAUL M. SWEEZY

HOW TO SPREAD THE WORD

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Europe: Frances Kelly, 9 King Edward Mansions, 629 Fulham Road, London, S.W.6., Telephone: Renown 8824.
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EDITORS: Leo Huberman and Paul M. Sweezy.

NOTES FROM THE EDITORS

We had the privilege of knowing Che Guevara in Havana in 1960 and again in New York when he came to represent Cuba at the United Nations in the fall of 1964. He was a unique human being who will certainly go down in history as one of the greatest revolutionaries of all time. We mourn his death as we hail his magnificent example. Like Patrice Lumumba and Malcoln X, Che will remain alive in the hearts and minds of millions of oppressed people struggling for freedom and dignity.

In next month's MR we will publish a fine tribute to Che by his close friend Eduardo Galeano of Montevideo. But perhaps the most important way we can honor his memory is to make available to the English-speaking public his literary masterpiece *Pasajes de la Guerra Revolucionaria.* We have been working for months on an English edition of this work which first appeared in various Cuban periodicals and in book form in 1963. Recently the Paris publishing house of Maspero brought out a French edition, adding several chapters to the Spanish. The MR Press volume, which will bear the title *Reminiscences of the Cuban Revolutionary War,* will be the most complete in any language. In addition to 31 chapters (the Spanish had 19), it will contain a prologue, an introduction consisting of Fidel's speech eulogizing Che at the Plaza de la Revolución on October 18th, diagrams of several battles, photographs from the guerrilla period, end-paper maps of the guerrilla itinerary in the Sierra Maestra, and 26 remarkable letters written by Che between

(Continued on inside back cover)

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NOTES ON THE CENTENNIAL OF DAS KAPITAL

One hundred years ago—to be exact, in September of 1867—the first volume of Karl Marx's *Das Kapital* was published in Hamburg, Germany. The event marked a turning point not only in the history of political economy but in the entire scientific-intellectual development of the modern world. The very embodiment of materialist dialectics, *Das Kapital* presented an indictment of the present and a vision of the future of unprecedented power and passion. Those who recognized in it a revelation of truth—and their number has never ceased to increase—became disciples and followers. The others, much as they might want to, could not ignore it. Many were profoundly influenced, often without their knowledge and sometimes even against their will. And the opponents, for whom it was strictly from the devil, had to fight it as best they could. After a hundred years, Karl Marx and his magnum opus occupy a position in the intellectual life of humanity which is without precedent and without comparison.

It is not to this grand theme that we propose to address ourselves in these notes, however, but to certain issues in political economy which a century after the publication of *Das Kapital* seem in need of clarification or further study.*

Marx and the Classics

It is a commonplace that Marx learned political economy from the English classical school, and particularly from its greatest figure, David Ricardo. In many ways, indeed, Marx's

* We continue to use the German title because it was not until 20 years later, in 1887, that an English translation of Volume 1 was published. In this connection it is interesting to note that the first foreign translation was the Russian which appeared in 1872, fifteen years before the English. In what follows references are to the Kerr edition of the Moore and Aveling translation.

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work is a logical continuation and development of classical theory. This holds above all for his conceptual apparatus—value, surplus value, organic composition of capital, rate of profit, etc.—most of which was present, at least in embryonic form, in Ricardo. And yet the conclusions reached in Marx's *Kapital* are miles apart from those of Ricardo's *Principles*.

Both Ricardo and Marx saw the driving force of capitalist development in the accumulation process. But what Ricardo derived was a sort of law of economic entropy, ending in the famous "stationary state." Accumulation involved hiring more workers and cultivating progressively less fertile land, thus raising the rent of all previously cultivated land. Since (in the classical view) wages were fixed at the lowest level compatible with the required expansion of the population, the increasing take of the landlords could only be at the expense of the capitalist's profit. The logical end of this process would come when profit had been squeezed down to the point where the capitalist lacked either the ability or the motivation to go on accumulating. Economic progress would thus be brought to a halt by what the classics regarded as two overriding natural laws: the law of diminishing returns and the Malthusian law of population. It was this vision which caused Carlyle to brand political economy the "dismal science."

Marx's view of the accumulation process and its outcome was of course entirely different. The capitalists protect their profits by introducing ever more and better machinery which both raises the productivity of labor and throws workers out of jobs and into the "industrial reserve army." It is the latter, which Marx also called "relative surplus population," and not Malthusian population pressure which keeps wages in line. In this analysis of the accumulation process, the old bogeys of the classics—diminishing returns and Malthusianism—simply disappear. In their place, however, Marx discovered a whole series of contradictions, unsuspected by his predecessors, which pointed to an entirely different future for the capitalist system. In the first place, there were all the forces making for economic cycles and crises: anarchy of capitalist production, falling tendency of the rate of profit, growing disproportionality be-

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tween capacity to produce and capacity to consume. Secondly, there was the process which Marx called the concentration and centralization of capital, involving the "expropriation of many capitalists by few." And finally, there was the growth of an increasingly exploited, disciplined, and potentially revolutionary proletariat.* All of these forces and tendencies, combining and interacting, were leading to an inevitable climax:

> The monopoly of capital becomes a fetter upon the mode of production, which has sprung up and flourished along with, and under it. Centralization of the means of production and socialization of labor at last reach a point where they become incompatible with their capitalist integument. This integument is burst asunder. The knell of capitalist private property sounds. The expropriators are expropriated. (p. 837.)

How are we to account for the fact that Marx, using a conceptual apparatus derived from and similar to that of the classics nevertheless reached such radically different conclusions? One is tempted to answer that the explanation lies in the different class interests espoused by Marx. A moment's reflection, however, will show that this is not so. Classical political economy, especially in its most developed Ricardian form, was entirely compatible with a theory of class struggle. Indeed it highlighted the conflict of interests between capitalists and landlords, and the so-called Ricardian socialists soon showed that the theory was equally capable of explaining a conflict of interests between capitalists and workers. Like these anti-capitalist writers—with whose work he was of course familiar—Marx could have championed the cause of the working class without making any important changes in classical economic theory. That he did not do so but instead transformed classical political economy into a radically new theory of economic and social development must be explained by something other than class interest and allegiance.

The most satisfactory explanation seems to be that real and fundamental changes took place in the capitalist system between the period when classical political economy took shape

* On this and related issues, see the article "Marx and the Proletariat," by Paul Sweezy, which begins on page 25 below.

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in the 18th century and the period when Marx wrote *Das Kapital* approximately a hundred years later.* These changes were effected by what Marx was one of the first to call the industrial revolution, which took place precisely during these hundred years. The capitalism of the middle of the 18th century was dominated on the industrial side by what Marx called the system of manufacture. Here the methods and instruments of production were essentially those of the artisan workshop, but the gathering of many workers under a single roof made possible the kind of elaborate division of labor which Adam Smith so admired and praised as the true secret of increasing productivity and wealth. To the system which emerged from the industrial revolution Marx gave the name of modern industry. Its hallmark was production by machinery, first introduced on a large scale in the textile industry in the 18th century and gradually spreading to other key industries. The final step was to "construct machines by machines."

> It was not till it [modern industry] did this that it built up for itself a fitting technical foundation, and stood on its own feet. Machinery, simultaneously with the increasing use of it, in the first decades of this century, appropriated, by degrees, the fabrication of machines proper. But it was only during the decade preceding 1866 that the construction of railways and ocean steamers on a stupendous scale called into existence the cyclopean machines now employed in the construction of prime movers. (p. 420.)

The replacement of manufacture by machinery necessarily meant the transformation of capitalism's laws of motion. For, as Marx wrote:

> Modern industry never looks upon and treats the existing form of a process as final. *The technical basis of that industry is therefore revolutionary, while all earlier modes of production were essentially conservative.* By means of machinery, chemical

* It is true that Ricardo's *Principles* did not appear until 1817. However, he was inspired to write it by reading Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations* (1776), and it was Smith's economic reality with which he was concerned. The famous chapter "On Machinery," which raised altogether new problems and in a sense foreshadowed Marx's economic reality, was added as a kind of afterthought to the third edition of the *Principles* (1821).

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processes, and other methods, it is continually causing changes not only in the technical basis of production, but also in the functions of the laborer and in the labor-process. (pp. 532-533; emphasis added.)*

Since classical political economy dealt with one of these earlier "essentially conservative" modes of production, it is not surprising that it envisaged a development process characterized by purely quantitative changes ending in a state of rest (the stationary state). However, the categories of classical political economy were derived from the class structure of capitalism and not from the mode of production of the period of manufacture. They could therefore be taken over, perfected, and used by Marx to analyze the *modus operandi* of capitalism in the period of modern industry.

The classics could afford an objective analysis of the capitalism of their day because, apart from the transforming action of the industrial revolution which could only be understood later, it was in truth not a crisis-laden system headed for explosions and disasters. By the middle of the 19th century this was no longer so. The industrial revolution had done its work, and the machinery-based system of modern industry was irrevocably launched on the course which led to the great wars and revolutions of the 20th century. Bourgeois political economy could not honestly face this situation, and it therefore rapidly degenerated, first producing what Marx called a "herd of vulgar economic apologists" (p. 669n) and then, with the ascendance of the various marginal utility schools, retreating altogether from the realities of the capitalist system. It was left for Marx and his followers to carry on in the honorable scientific tradition which classical political economy had pioneered.

Development in the Advanced Countries

Except for the next-to-last (27th) chapter entitled "The So-called Primitive Accumulation,"** *Das Kapital* is concerned

* Some of the implications of these changes in the "functions of the laborer and in the labor-process" are explored in the article, already cited, on "Marx and the Proletariat." See especially p. 28 ff.

** In the English translation this chapter appears as a separate Part, and its seven sections as separate chapters.

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with the analysis of a capitalist society in which modern industry has already achieved dominance and the accumulation of capital takes place through the investment of capitalistically produced surplus value. Contemporary Britain of course provided most of the empirical material from which Marx distilled his generalizations. And it was obvious that it was in such a country or group of countries that he expected the process of capitalist development to run its course and produce its own negation in the shape of the socialist revolution. It is true that during the last years of his life, Marx—and Engels after Marx's death—began to think in terms of the next wave of revolutions starting in Tsarist Russia; but this did not lead to any changes in theoretical position, and both men continued to believe that the decisive struggles would be fought out in the advanced capitalist countries.

Given this background and given the fact that for the first half century after the publication of Volume I revolutionary movements grew to importance only in Europe and North America, it was only to be expected that political economists among Marx's followers would continue to concentrate their attention on the development of capitalism in the advanced countries. Much discussion and debate took place on such subjects as the nature of economic fluctuations and crises; whether crises are getting more or less severe; whether capitalism is headed for a specifically economic collapse; the economic and social consequences of the concentration and centralization of capital; the emergence and consequences of finance capital; the economic role of the state; and the driving force behind the imperialist expansion of the great capitalist powers.

It is obviously impossible in a brief essay to review the extensive literature dealing with these subjects or to attempt to relate the various positions taken by the protagonists to Marx's theory as set forth in *Das Kapital.** What we want to emphasize is that for the most part these controversies shared a common point of departure which was unquestionably derived from

* An effort in this direction, with respect to the problems of crises and economic breakdown, is contained in Paul M. Sweezy, *The Theory of Capitalist Development,* Part III, especially Chapter 11.

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Marx himself: they all took for granted that the arena of decision for the future of capitalism (and socialism) would be the advanced countries of Europe and North America. Even those who appreciated the enormous revolutionary potential of Russia—and their number included, even before the abortive revolution of 1905, such outstanding figures as Kautsky, Rosa Luxemburg, and Lenin—thought of that country primarily as the potential initiator of a general European revolution. It did not occur to them that the main impact of a successful Russian revolution would be, not on the advanced countries of the West but on their much more numerous and vastly more populous colonies and dependencies in what is nowadays called the Third World. It was not until *after* the revolution of 1917, and only in the light of actual historical developments, that Marxists began to understand that the world revolution was taking a course very different from the one they had expected. Even then they were slow to grasp the full significance of this fact and to provide an adequate theoretical explanation. And to this day they have not faced squarely up to the question whether the history of the world revolution during the last half century is or is not compatible with the fundamental theoretical schema of *Das Kapital*. It is to these questions that we now turn.

Development of the Dependent Countries

In the Preface to the French and German editions of *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism,* Lenin wrote: "Capitalism has grown into a world system of colonial oppression and of the financial strangulation of the overwhelming majority of the people of the world by a handful of 'advanced' countries." *Imperialism* was not, however, an attempt to analyze the functioning of this "world system" considered as a whole. Its purpose was the more limited and urgent one of explaining the nature of the war then raging—the work was written in 1916—and what revolutionaries in the warring countries should do about it. This required that Lenin focus attention on the "handful of 'advanced' countries" (which were doing the fighting) and take into account the "overwhelming majority of the people of the world" only to the extent that they were the

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objects of the policies of their oppressors and strangulators. Like most other Marxists at the time, Lenin believed that an end would be put to this monstrous system by proletarian revolutions in Europe. And when the Russian Revolution triumphed in 1917, he, again like other Marxists, regarded it as but the prelude to a revolution at least in Germany and possibly in all of Central and Western Europe. How confident he was in the correctness of this prognosis is well reflected in the last two paragraphs of his famous polemic against Kautsky, *The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky*, dated November 10, 1918:

> The above lines were written on November 9, 1918. That same night news was received from Germany announcing the beginning of a victorious revolution, first in Kiel and other northern towns and ports, where the power has passed into the hands of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, then in Berlin, where, too, power has passed into the hands of a Soviet.
>
> The conclusion which still remained to be written to my pamphlet on Kautsky and on the proletarian revolution is now superfluous.

Appearances, unfortunately, were deceiving. The 1918 revolution in Germany remained at the purely political level, leaving the capitalist order itself intact; and later revolutions in the aftermath of the war were either similar (Austria) or were suppressed (Hungary and Bavaria). It is probably safe to say that most Marxists at the time did not understand the significance of these defeats, believing them to be merely temporary setbacks to be followed in due course by a new, and this time victorious, revolutionary wave in the developed capitalist countries of Europe.

History took a different course. After the failure of the postwar revolutions, Europe ceased to be the center of international revolutionary movements. From that time on, revolutionary initiative shifted away from what Lenin had called the handful of advanced countries to their victims, the overwhelming majority of the people of the world. And it was a measure of Lenin's genius that in the very few years remaining before his death he saw this shift coming and sensed its epoch-making significance. In the last thing he ever wrote for publication,

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"Better Fewer, But Better," which appeared in *Pravda* on March 2, 1923, Lenin said:

The system of international relationships which has now taken shape is a system in which one of the states of Europe, viz., Germany, has been enslaved by the victor countries. Furthermore, a number of states, namely, the oldest states in the West, are in a position to utilize their victory to make a number of insignificant concessions to their oppressed classes—concessions which, insignificant though they are, nevertheless retard the revolutionary movement in those countries and create some semblance of "social peace."

At the same time, precisely as a result of the last imperialist war, a number of countries—the East, India, China, etc.—have been completely dislodged from their groove. Their development has definitely shifted to the European capitalist lines. The general European ferment has begun to affect them, and it is now clear to the whole world that they have been drawn into a process of development that cannot but lead to a crisis in the whole of world capitalism.

Thus at the present time we are confronted with the question: Shall we be able to hold on with our small and very small peasant production, and in our present state of ruin, while the West-European capitalist countries are consummating their development toward socialism? But they are consummating it not as we formerly expected. They are not consummating it by the gradual "maturing" of socialism, but by the exploitation of some countries by others, by the exploitation of the first of the countries to be vanquished in the imperialist war combined with the exploitation of the whole of the East. On the other hand, precisely as a result of the first imperialist war, the East has been definitely drawn into the revolutionary movement, has been definitely drawn into the general maelstrom of the world revolutionary movement. . . .

In the last analysis, the outcome of the struggle will be determined by the fact that Russia, India, China, etc., account for the overwhelming majority of the population of the globe. And it is precisely this majority that, during the past few years, has been drawn into the struggle for emancipation with extraordinary rapidity, so that in this respect there cannot be the slightest shadow of doubt what the final outcome of the world struggle will be. In this sense, the complete victory of socialism is fully and absolutely assured.

It is true that at several points in this exposition Lenin's meaning is not altogether clear. In particular, the idea that

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the European capitalist countries "are consummating their advance toward socialism . . . by the exploitation of some countries by others" can be interpreted in different ways. Nevertheless there can be no doubt at all that Lenin had abandoned the traditional Marxist view that the socialist revolution was essentially an affair of the advanced countries and that the fate of the rest of the world depended on the success or failure of their proletariats. The scene had definitely and irrevocably shifted to the whole globe, and there was at least the possibility that thenceforth the main actors would be the underdeveloped countries.

With the development of revolutionary and national independence struggles in the Third World—especially in China and India, the world's two most populous countries—this global view of the revolutionary process came to be increasingly accepted among Marxists. And it should logically have led to a systematic, scientific study and analysis of a whole series of problems which Marxist theory, because of its preoccupation with the development of the advanced countries, had hitherto ignored or treated only incidentally. What needed investigating above all was the typical course of development of a country which entered the capitalist system as the colony or dependency of an advanced country—typical in the same sense that *Das Kapital* had investigated the typical course of development of a capitalist country which had already been through the historical experiences of primitive accumulation and industrial revolution.

One may speculate that if Lenin had lived, such work might have been undertaken and the international Communist movement might have been provided with crucially important understanding of the functioning of capitalism not just as a system existing in the industrialized West but as a global system of exploiting and exploited nations. Unfortunately Lenin did not live and the work was not undertaken. What happened instead was a more or less mechanical application to the new situation of theories familiar to all Marxists since the publication of the *Communist Manifesto*. Capitalism in Europe had emerged out of feudalism and had consolidated its power

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through a bourgeois revolution, i.e. a revolution led by the bourgeoisie in alliance with workers and peasants. After that—in some cases, as in Russia in 1917, very soon after that—would come the proletarian revolution and the beginning of the transition from capitalism to socialism.

This schema was now applied to the colonies and dependencies containing the great majority of the world's population. The prevailing state of backwardness was equated with European feudalism and local bourgeoisies with the rising mercantile and industrial capitalists of the West. To maintain its power, imperialism had allied itself with the feudalists. In this situation it was assumed that the colonial bourgeoisies would take the lead in fighting against both feudalism and imperialism, and that it was the duty of revolutionaries representing the interests of the masses to support them in this two-sided struggle. Victory would be followed by national independence, bourgeois-democratic reforms, and the opening of a new struggle for the proletarian-socialist revolution.

Wherever this theory was acted upon, the result was failure and in some cases disaster. China in the mid-1920's is the most striking example. Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang, supposedly representing a national bourgeoisie in the fight against feudalism and for independence, proved in practice to be agents and allies of imperialism who turned against their Communist supporters and slaughtered them wholesale. But it was not only as a guide to action that the theory fell down. The expectations to which it gave rise were nowhere realized, and its explanatory value has been consistently negative.

Challenges to this new brand of Marxist orthodoxy gradually developed from two entirely different quarters. After its defeats of 1927 the Chinese Communist Party under Mao Tse-tung's leadership re-formed in the countryside and hammered out a new revolutionary conception which relegated the national bourgeoisie to a mere followership role and recognized that serious reform, whether of a bourgeois-democratic or socialist nature, would be possible only after the seizure of power by the party of the workers and peasants. While this political line was being developed in practice in China, some Marxists in the

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West were working toward a more adequate theory of capitalism-imperialism considered as a global system, with special emphasis on the nature and effects of imperialist economic relations on the underdeveloped colonies and dependencies.

The history of this intellectual development will have to be written some day: here we will be content to mention two important milestones, R. Palme Dutt's *India Today* (1940) and Paul A. Baran's *Political Economy of Growth* (1957). Dutt's book is a brilliant, fully documented study of the economic (and social) ruination of India under British rule. Its most serious flaw is that the author, under the influence of the Communist orthodoxy of the 20's and 30's, still imagined that the Indian bourgeoisie, even though the product of a long degenerative process, could play a progressive historical role. A reader of the book when it appeared could never again be unaware of the devastating impact of imperialism on its victims, but he would not have been prepared for the tragedy of independent India ruled by her own bourgeoisie. Baran's book was perhaps the first to put forward a general theory of the dialectical interrelation of development in the industrialized countries and underdevelopment in the colonies and dependencies, and as such it made a tremendous impression on many younger Marxists, especially in the Third World.*

What all this adds up to is that the whole complex of policies and ideas which rested on the assumption of an essential similarity between the transition from feudalism to capitalism in Western Europe on the one hand and the national liberation of capitalism's colonies and dependencies on the other—this whole complex has been decisively refuted both practically and theoretically. It is too early to say that in its place an adequate theory of world capitalism and the means necessary to overthrow it has been worked out. But much pro-

* "For me, Paul Baran's systematic examination of the development of underdevelopment as the reverse side of the coin of development under capitalism on a world scale opens the door to the understanding of world history, past, present, and future." The words are those of A. Gunder Frank, writing in the special Baran memorial issue of MONTHLY REVIEW (March, 1965). Frank himself is one of the most important continuators of work in this area.

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gress has been made, and there is every reason to hope that the goal will be reached in the not distant future.

Marx's Position

Marx opened the Preface to the *Critique of Political Economy* (1859) with the following sentence: "I consider the system of bourgeois economy in the following order: *Capital, landed property, wage labor; state, foreign trade, world market.*" By the time he wrote the first volume of *Das Kapital* he had already abandoned this outline, and he never returned to it. As a result we have no systematic exposition from his pen of the last three topics—state, foreign trade, world market. This is too bad, because if Marx had written specifically and at length on these subjects, the chances are good that he would have established a framework of thinking about capitalism as an international, world-wide system which might have served his followers well when the course of history obliged them to adopt precisely such a perspective. As it is, all we can do is attempt to show that he did have a position and that as far as it goes it foreshadows, and is fully compatible with, the best modern work in this area.

There are two parts of Volume I which are particularly relevant: (1) The section of the chapter on primitive accumulation entitled "Genesis of the Industrial Capitalist" (pp. 822-834 in the English edition); and (2) a passage from the chapter on machinery and modern industry (pp. 492-493: this passage is also cited below, pp. 14-15). The first deals with the early impact of the emerging capitalist countries on the rest of the world, the second with the consequences of machinery and modern industry for relations between the developed and underdeveloped countries.

(1) *The Early Impact.* Under this heading we need do no more, and could do no better, than quote several passages dispersed through the chapter in question:

> The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement, and entombment in mines of the aboriginal population, the beginning of the conquest and looting of the East Indies, the turning of Africa into a warren for the commercial hunting

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of black-skins, signalized the rosy dawn of the era of capitalist production. (p. 823.)

To secure Malacca, the Dutch corrupted the Portuguese governor. He let them into the town in 1641. They hurried at once to his house and assassinated him, to "abstain" from the payment of £21,875, the price of his treason. Wherever they set foot, devastation and depopulation followed. Banjuwangi, a province of Java, in 1750 numbered over 80,000 inhabitants, in 1811 only 18,000. Sweet commerce! (p. 824.)

The treatment of the aborigines was, naturally, most frightful in plantation-colonies destined for export trade only, such as the West Indies, and in rich and well-populated countries, such as Mexico and India, that were given over to plunder. (p. 825.)

The colonial system ripened, like a hot house, trade and navigation. . . . The colonies secured a market for the budding manufactures, and, through the monopoly of the market, an increased accumulation. The treasures captured outside Europe by undisguised looting, enslavement, and murder, floated back to the mother country and were there turned into capital. (p. 826.)

The system of protection was an artificial means of manufacturing manufacturers, of expropriating independent laborers, of capitalizing the national means of production and subsistence, of forcibly abbreviating the transition from the medieval to the modern mode of production. The European states tore each other to pieces about the patent of this invention, and, once entered into the service of the surplus-value makers, did not merely lay under contribution in the pursuit of this purpose their own people, indirectly through protective duties, directly through export premiums. They also forcibly rooted out, in their dependent countries, all industry. . . . (p. 830.)

Whilst the cotton industry introduced child slavery in England, it gave in the United States a stimulus to the transformation of the earlier, more or less patriarchal slavery, into a system of commercial exploitation. In fact, the veiled slavery of the wage earners in Europe needed, for its pedestal, slavery pure and simple in the new world. (p. 833.)

(2) *Machinery and Modern Industry.* As the above quotations indicate, capitalism in Europe came into existence not only through looting the rest of the world of its accumulated treasures but also through actively ruining their established social systems. Did a more productive and "civilized" capitalism later make amends? Here is Marx's answer:

On the one hand, the immediate effect of machinery is to

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increase the supply of raw material in the same way, for example, as the cotton gin augmented the production of cotton. On the other hand, the cheapness of the articles produced by machinery, and the improved means of transport and communication furnish the weapons for conquering foreign markets. By ruining handicraft production in other countries, machinery forcibly converts them into fields for the supply of its raw material. In this way East India was compelled to produce cotton, wool, hemp, jute, and indigo for Great Britain. By constantly making a part of the hands "supernumerary," modern industry, in all countries where it has taken root, gives a spur to emigration and to the colonization of foreign lands, which are thereby converted into settlements for growing the raw material of the mother country. . . . A new and international division of labor, a division suited to the requirements of the chief centers of modern industry springs up and converts one part of the globe into a chiefly agricultural field of production, for supplying the other part which remains a chiefly industrial field. (pp. 492-493.)

The impact of capitalism on the rest of the world was thus by no means confined to its early stages but continued into the period of modern industry—with this difference, that now its weapons were less the open, brutal use of force and more the insidious penetrating power of the market. If one looked at capitalism as a global system, the progress of the advanced sector was at all stages the direct cause of retrogression in the remainder. Long before he wrote *Das Kapital*, Marx had observed and commented upon this process at work in the relationship between Britain and India:

There cannot . . . remain any doubt but that the misery inflicted by the British on Hindustan is of an essentially different and infinitely more intensive kind than all Hindustan had to suffer before. . . .

All the civil wars, invasions, revolutions, conquests, famines, strangely complex, rapid and destructive as the successive action in Hindustan may appear, did not go deeper than its surface. England has broken down the entire framework of Indian society, without any symptoms of reconstitution yet appearing. This loss of his old world, with no gain of a new one, imparts a particular kind of melancholy to the present misery of the Hindu, and separates Hindustan, ruled by Britain, from all its ancient traditions, and from the whole of its past history. (*New York Daily Tribune*, June 25, 1853. Reprinted in K. Marx and F. Engels, *On Colonialism*, Moscow, no date, pp. 33-34.)

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There is thus no doubt that Marx was fully aware of the causal relationship between the development of capitalism in Europe and the development of underdevelopment in the rest of the world. He had the basic elements of a theory of capitalism as a global system, and the pity is that his followers did not see this in good time and understand the importance of extending and developing his ideas. If they had, they surely could not have believed that the colonies and dependencies of the capitalist empires were in a state of "feudalism" or that their crippled and dependent economies could produce other than a crippled and dependent bourgeoisie. They would thus have seen from the outset the absurdity of treating the theoretical schema of the *Communist Manifesto* as a universal formula.

In reality these lessons had to be learned a harder way, and unfortunately there are many who consider themselves Marxists who have still not learned them. For them, the centennial of *Das Kapital* could well be an occasion to read, or re-read, the works of the master and to seek earnestly to bring their thinking into line with his.

(November 13, 1967)

It may be appropriate to remind those who may be inclined to treat Marx as a mere revolutionary or hot partisan that he was more than that. He was a doctor of philosophy from a German university, possessing the hallmark of the scholar. He was a student of Greek and Latin learning. He read, besides German, his native tongue, Greek, Latin, French, English, Italian, and Russian. He was widely read in contemporary history and economic thought. Hence, however much one may dislike Marx's personal views, one cannot deny to him wide and deep knowledge—and a fearless and sacrificial life. He not only interpreted history, as everyone does who writes any history, but he helped to make history. Possibly he may have known something.

—Charles Beard, American Historical Review, October, 1935

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DISCOVERING DAS KAPITAL

BY ISAAC DEUTSCHER

The conditions in which a young Polish intellectual studied *Das Kapital* in the 1920's or 1930's were very different from those prevailing in most countries in the West. To us the Marxist forecast of the collapse of capitalism was not an apocalyptic vision related only remotely to the realities of our daily life. The old social order was crumbling before our very eyes. This was the overwhelming fact of our existence. We could not escape it. My own childhood and adolescence was shaken by it again and again. I grew up in Cracow and in a little town half-way between Cracow and Auschwitz, on a tip of land wedged between the frontiers of three empires. As a boy of ten and eleven I watched the downfall of the dynasties of the Romanovs, Habsburgs, and Hohenzollerns. Overnight there vanished the ancient powers, sanctitities, and fetishes that had held our people in awe for many generations. We felt the hot breath of the Russian Revolution. Then, just across the frontier, the Commune of Budapest flared up and was drowned in blood.

At 13, I absorbed from the adults the tense mood in which they watched the news of the Red Army's advance on Warsaw. For years we lived almost constantly on the brink of civil war, amid galloping inflation, mass unemployment, pogroms, abortive revolution, and futile counter-revolutions. But even before these cataclysms, in the remote and spuriously idyllic pre-1914 era, Marxism had been, in our parts, the accepted ideology of almost the entire labor movement. Our right-wing Social Democrats no less than our Communists still considered *Das Kapital* as the "Bible of the working class," like the old Bible, dusty

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This is the text of a talk given last summer on the BBC's Third Programme. It is reproduced here by permission. Isaac Deutscher is the author of distinguished biographies of Stalin and Trotsky, and at the time of his death at the age of 60 last August he was working on a biography of Lenin.—The Editors

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and unread, but revered. Portraits of Marx and Lassalle stared at us from the wall of every trade union local and socialist youth organization and even of many Zionist clubs. I got my first inkling of historical materialism from older schoolmates; and although my own middle-class and orthodox Jewish upbringing inclined me against it, the shakiness of our social existence made me reluctantly receptive to some of the revolutionary ideas in the air.

I tried to read *Das Kapital* in late adolescence, but did not persevere. It seemed too hard a nut to crack, and I was not really interested in political economy. I had precociously started out as a poet and literary critic, and was in search of a philosophical approach to art. I was therefore interested primarily in the broad lines of the Marxist *Weltanschauung*. Turning away from *Das Kapital,* I tried to grasp these from Marx's and Engels' minor works, and from the writings of Plekhanov, Lenin, Mehring, Bukharin, and others. But their philosophical theories always pointed back to the socio-economic realities underlying the multiple forms of human consciousness.

And so I found myself scanning *Das Kapital* again and swallowing more popular expositions of its economic doctrine. I found these convincing enough, and I felt that they equipped me quite adequately for further literary and philosophical work and for political struggle. It was even with a hint of irritation that I read Marx's warning in one of his prefaces to *Das Kapital* that science knows no straight and broad highway and that "only those have a chance of attaining its clear summits who will not dodge the toil of climbing up its steep pathways." I wondered whether Marx had not made those pathways just a little too steep. Sometimes his dialectical subtleties seemed to me a trifle over-elaborate in an old-fashioned manner, and I wondered just how relevant they were. His exposition seemed to me too slow and leisurely for someone like myself, impatient to understand the world and to change it quickly. I was relieved to hear that Ignacy Daszynski, our famous Member of Parliament, a pioneer of socialism, an orator on whose lips hung the parliaments of Vienna and Warsaw, admitted that he too found *Das Kapital* too hard a nut. "I have not read

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it," he almost boasted, "but Karl Kautsky has read it and has written a popular summary of it. I have not read Kautsky either, but Kelles-Krauz, our party theorist, has read him and he summarized Kautsky's book. I have not read Kelles-Krauz either; but the clever Jew, Herman Diamond, our financial expert, has read Kelles-Krauz, and has told me all about it." Unlike the great Daszynski, I had at least read Kautsky and a host of other popularizers.

Meanwhile I had committed myself politically: I had joined the outlawed Communist Party. For years I was busy editing literary journals, writing political commentaries, illegal manifestos and leaflets, addressing workers, organizing even peasants, conducting, as a soldier, underground propaganda in Pilsudski's army, and all the time dodging the *gendarmerie* and the political police. In these circumstances I could not even dream of tackling *Das Kapital* seriously.

The time for that came a few years later, in 1932, when I was expelled from the party as spokesman of an anti-Stalinist opposition. I felt the need to re-examine my own political thinking and the principles of communism and Marxism. I decided to take nothing for granted. Could Stalinist policy and practices be justified in terms of Marxism? Has Marx's analysis and critique of capitalism stood up to the events of our time? These were the questions that troubled me. I made up my mind to plough through the whole of *Das Kapital,* all three volumes of it, and also the many volumed *Theorien über den Mehrwert,* Marx's history of economic doctrines. I was determined to scrutinize this whole intellectual structure coolly and skeptically, keeping my eyes open to its possible flaws and cracks. The *esprit de contradiction* got hold of me; at moments I was almost bent on proving Marx wrong. Perhaps because of this intense involvement or because of my greater intellectual maturity, I did not this time find "the steep pathways" at all forbidding.

In the next three or four years I read and re-read the great work in its entirety five or six times. I also plunged into the vast economic literature to which Marx referred; studied his bourgeois, academic, and social democratic critics; and acquainted

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myself with the varying interpretations and developments of *Das Kapital* offered by Kautsky, Lenin, Hilferding, Luxemburg, Bukharin, and others. I had left my starting point, poetry and aesthetics, far behind, and invested all my intellectual passions in monetary doctrines, the trade cycle, land rent, capital concentration in agriculture, the falling profit rate, the impoverishment of the working class, and other aspects of the dismal science. From explorations of Ricardo, Sismondi, Sombart, Böhm-Bawerk, and the early Keynes, I returned again and again to *Das Kapital* and was ever afresh captivated by the richness of its theoretical and historical texture and the crystal clarity of the analysis. The toil of the uphill climb was transformed into sheer excitement. I shall never forget the thrill with which from the "summit" I then viewed the boundless horizons on society that Marx, I felt, opened to me. No other work has ever impressed me with a comparable force.

But what about those flaws for which I had been on the look-out? Try as I did, I could not detect them. Every time I re-read the opus, I found it more rigorously argued and more convincing than I had thought it to be. I saw where, in the opening chapter, one might dissent from Marx and follow the theorists of marginal utility. That theory, however, failed to satisfy me—I could not accept it as an alternative to Marx's conceptions of value, commodity, and labor. And once I had accepted his premises, I could not help following him all the way through to his conclusions.

I was aware that Marx analyzed capitalism in its "pure form," as the chemist analyzes his elements, whereas in reality capitalism has absorbed and carries within itself the wreckage of all previous social orders. Yet no one underlines this more emphatically than Marx himself, and no one has elucidated the structural complexities of our society with anything approaching his historical realism. It is true that he dealt with laissez-faire and not with later quasi-monopolistic forms of capitalist organization. This, I reflected, did not render his analysis obsolete, for he shows precisely how the monopolistic forms grow out of laissez-faire; and he reveals, as no one else does, the organic connection between these phases of economic development. Even

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as early as in *Poverty of Philosophy,* published 20 years before *Das Kapital,* while he argued against Proudhon's idealization of free competition, he demonstrated how free competition tended towards monopoly, its dialectical opposite. Then, in *Das Kapital,* he dramatically extrapolated the process of concentration of capital to describe the "historical tendency of accumulation" leading to the expropriation of many entrepreneurs by ever fewer "magnates of capitalism." Even when, for the sake of argument, he assumed perfect competition, he did it only in order to prove that that competition was necessarily self-destructive. And so I could not (and I still cannot) help being puzzled by those of his academic critics who argue that Marx was unaware of the "imperfect competition" of our time. In truth, all later treatises on monopoly capital, non-Marxist and Marxist, including those by Hilferding and Lenin, are but illustrations of the manner in which economic evolution has on this point confirmed Marx's predictions.

More important still, Marx shows how in relation to the workers, even laissez-faire capitalism was never anything but monopolistic. There never was nor could there be any perfect competition between capital and labor, for even under the most "just" wage system, in conditions of an ideal exchange of equivalents between employer and worker, capital alone is in command of the means of production; and it alone appropriates surplus value. As long as this is so, I concluded, Marx's theory cannot be outdated, no matter how much the secondary features of the social order might be modified.

Even at that time, 30 or 35 years ago, I saw the essence of Marx's theory, not in this or that aspect of his analysis of the trade cycle, or even in his views on the impoverishment, relative or absolute, of the working class, important though these views were politically. Admittedly, he left some issues unresolved and some loose ends. But for me the essence of his analysis lay in what he says about the central contradiction of our social system, the conflict between the socialized process of production and the unsocial character of the control which capitalist ownership exercises over that process. Inherent in this is the worker's estrangement from his own labor, from the products of his labor,

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and from the structure of society which his labor perpetuates. Our "welfare state" has on the face of it toned down this estrangement, but only by deepening it: and it has cruelly aggravated the individual worker's alienation from other workers, that is from his own class.

The study of *Das Kapital* not merely confirmed me in my Marxist conviction and in the sense of its incompatibility with the tortoise nature of social democratic reformism; it also revealed to me the full depth of the gulf that lay between classical Marxism and the cynical expediencies, the dull scholasticism, and the inquisitorial methods of Stalinism. Ever since, it has seemed to me as incongruous to blame Marx for Stalin as it would be to blame the Bible and Aristotle for the dogmas of the medieval Church and the Inquisition. It was as a Marxist that I went on opposing Stalinism.

Slowly at first, but then irresistibly, I was entranced by the style of *Das Kapital.* It set what has remained in my eyes the highest standard of reasoning and expression, a standard none of his disciples, not even the greatest, has ever attained. While I realized that it would be unfair to apply this standard to other thinkers and writers, *Das Kapital* seems to have left me with something like a heightened sensitivity to the style of all reasoning on social and political problems. I thought that I could recognize the quality of any socialist or communist statement by its language and form. For a long time it was usually my aesthetic sense that was first offended by any piece of counterfeit or phony Marxism; only after this would I proceed to examine its political, philosophical, or economic content.

Even now it is usually a kind of aesthetic discomfort that first puts me on guard against any pretentious piece of pseudo-Marxist argumentation. I often experience this discomfort when I follow fashionable debates between the meta-Marxists, para-Marxists, Existentialists and Structuralists on subjects such as alienation, the young and the mature Marx, the "humanization" of Marxism, and the categories of dialectical reason.

Reading *Das Kapital,* I realized why its author never bothered to offer his readers a systematic exposition of the principles of dialectics, although occasionally he threatened to do so. He

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evidently preferred to apply these principles rather than to expound them; and how right he was. The fact is that attempts to formulate the rules of dialectics usually result in arid scholasticism. Dialectics is indeed the grammar of Marxist thinking. But just as one shows one's mastery of grammar not in reciting its rules, but in living speech, so one shows one's grasp of dialectics not in mulling over its formulae, but in coming to grips with specific, large and vital issues in history and contemporary affairs. No doubt the rules of dialectics have to be learned; a good manual, like a good grammatical textbook, has its uses. But one-sided preoccupation with abstract methodology is often a form of ideological escapism, even if those who indulge in it love to dwell on Praxis and spell Praxis with a capital "p." *Das Kapital* is the supreme example of the dialectical mind in action, of the dialectical mind using all its power of abstraction to plough up layer after layer of empirical social experience.

Marx was, of course, greatly concerned with the problems of his philosophical workshop as well, and with the nature of his intellectual tools, those he had inherited from others and those he himself invented. But the workshop and the tools were not ends in themselves—they were there to process the economic and socio-political raw material and to turn out the finished product.

Last but not least, *Das Kapital* was for me a memorable artistic experience. I realized that like a few other epoch-making discoveries, it was the result not merely of rigorous reasoning and heroic research, but of a creative imagination which had harnessed reasoning and research for one of its tremendous leaps. In science, such leaps have produced new visions of the universe, of the structure of matter, and of the emergence and growth of the species. Copernicus, Newton, Darwin, and Einstein, each of them must have been endowed with an extraordinary capacity of image-making to be able to see the world in a startlingly new shape, perspective, and light, hidden from predecessors and contemporaries. A withdrawn artistic genius lived in each of these giants of science. The same, I think, is true of Marx. For how otherwise would he have been able to

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focus his thoughts and ideas into that image of society's past and that vision of its future which have ever since inspired one section of mankind and haunted another?

Marx's artistry is more directly evident in the massive and classically pure architecture of *Das Kapital,* in the force and suppleness of its language, in his grave dramatic pathos, his satire and his imagery. I know that what I am saying may baffle those who have tried to tackle *Das Kapital* in the English translation and have found his prose involved and cumbersome. I once had a similar experience with Shakespeare whom I first read in wretched Polish translations. Only after I had learned English and heard his lines spoken on the English stage did I succumb to the full force of his poetry. *Wer den Dichter will verstehen, muss im Dichters Lande gehen.* Unfortunately, Marx's style and language cannot be easily Anglicized, although the existing translations are far more clumsy and stiff than they need have been.

As to the merits of the original, I would like to recall that Franz Mehring, a fastidious literary critic (and Marx's bitter opponent before he became his follower), devoted a special essay to the poetic quality of Marx's writing. He analyzed the similes and metaphors of *Das Kapital,* underlining their rare combination of imaginative inventiveness and conceptual precision; and he found a parallel for them only in Goethe's metaphors and similes. For a German literary critic this was, of course, the supreme tribute.

One final remark: for over 30 years after I had studied *Das Kapital,* I never went back to it. During all this time I merely glanced at its pages on a few very rare occasions. Recently, I began reading it anew because I had undertaken to write a full-scale study of *Das Kapital.* I have so far gone through the first three chapters, those reputed to be exceptionally involved and abstruse—Marx himself was slightly apologetic about their "abstract and Hegelian" style. I find myself still fascinated by the old familiar pages; but what strikes me about them now, as it never did before, is their essential simplicity.

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MARX AND THE PROLETARIAT

BY PAUL M. SWEEZY

Marx's theory of capitalism, which was sketched with broad and sweeping strokes in the *Communist Manifesto* and achieved its most comprehensive and polished form in the first volume of *Capital,* published just a hundred years ago, holds that capitalism is a self-contradictory system which generates increasingly severe difficulties and crises as it develops. But this is only half the story: equally characteristic of capitalism is that it generates not only difficulties and crises but also its own gravediggers in the shape of the modern proletariat. A social system can be ever so self-contradictory and still be without a revolutionary potential: the outcome can be, and in fact history shows many examples where it has been, stagnation, misery, starvation, subjugation by a stronger and more vigorous society. In Marx's view capitalism was not such a society; it was headed not for slow death or subjugation but for a thorough-going revolutionary transformation. And the reason was precisely because by its very nature it had to produce the agent which would revolutionize it. This is the crucially important role which the proletariat plays in the Marxian theoretical schema.

In the eyes of many people, including not a few who consider themselves to be essentially Marxists, this theory of the revolutionary agency of the proletariat is the weakest point of the whole system. They point to the fact that the English and other Western European proletariats, which Marx considered to be the vanguard of the international revolutionary movement, have actually developed into reformist forces which, by accepting the basic assumptions of capitalism, in fact strengthen it. And they note that the proletariat of what has become the most advanced and powerful capitalist country, the United States of America, has never developed a significant revolu-

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tionary leadership or movement, and shows fewer signs of doing so today than at any time in its history.

I do not believe that the empirical observations which support this type of criticism of Marx's theory can be seriously challenged. And yet it certainly will not do to jump from there to the conclusion that Marx's theory is "refuted" and must be abandoned. A more legitimate procedure, I suggest, is to inquire into the inner logic of the theory to discover *why* Marx assigned the role of revolutionary agent to the proletariat. In this way I believe we shall find that it is not the theory itself which is at fault so much as its misinterpretation and misapplication.

First, we must be quite clear that Marx's theory of the revolutionary agency of the proletariat has nothing to do with an emotional attachment to, or blind faith in, the working class as such. He believed that objective forces, generated by the capitalist system, were inexorably molding a revolutionary class, i.e. one which would have both the ability and the will to overthrow the existing order. The ability stemmed from its numerical strength and its indispensable role in the capitalist production process, the will from its being deprived not only of material possessions but of its essential and ultimately irrepressible humanity. Marx's position is perhaps most clearly stated in the following passage from *The Holy Family*:

> When socialist writers ascribe this world-historical role to the proletariat, this is not at all . . . because they take the proletarians for gods. Quite the contrary. Because the abstraction of all humanity, even the appearance of humanity, is practically complete in the fully developed proletariat, because the living conditions of the proletariat represent the focal point of all inhuman conditions in contemporary society, because the human being is lost in the proletariat, but has won a theoretical consciousness of loss and is compelled by unavoidable and absolutely compulsory need (the practical expression of necessity) to revolt against this inhumanity—all these are the reasons why the proletariat can and must emancipate itself. However, it cannot emancipate itself without abolishing the conditions which give it life, and it cannot abolish these conditions without abolishing all those inhuman conditions of social life which are summed up in its own situation.
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> It does not go through the hard and hardening school of

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labor fruitlessly. It is not a question of what this or that proletarian, or even the proletariat as a whole, may imagine for the moment to be the aim. It is a question of what the proletariat actually is and what it will be compelled to do historically as the result of this being. The aim and the historical action of the proletariat are laid down in advance, irrevocably and obviously, in its own situation in life and in the whole organization of contemporary bourgeois society.*

The next question is this: What were the processes which molded a proletariat with these particular characteristics? One answer, which I suppose many Marxists would subscribe to, would hold that the revolutionary proletariat is inherent in capitalism and is therefore the creation of the very same processes which originally brought the system into existence and which have subsequently propelled its development. The first step, in this view, was what Marx called primitive accumulation which in one aspect was essentially the violent and bloody process of separating the working people from ownership of their means of production. After that, the expansion of the proletariat to its ultimate position of numerical dominance in capitalist society was the natural result of expanded reproduction on a capitalist basis. Expanded reproduction, as you know, consists of the appropriation by capitalists of surplus value created by wage laborers, and the continuous conversion of part of the surplus value into additional capital.

Now there can be no question that this is an accurate account of Marx's theory of the birth and *quantitative* expansion of the proletariat. But does it explain why he regarded the proletariat as the revolutionary agent destined to overthrow the system? If we say that it does, we necessarily imply that the proletariat was revolutionary from its birth and that only quantitative predominance was required for it to be able to perform its revolutionary function; for there is nothing in the mere mechanics of the expanded reproduction process to bring about a *qualitative* transformation of the proletariat. At this point it is therefore of first importance to recognize that in Marx's view

* Marx/Engels, *Werke,* Vol. 2, p. 38. Except for the first two sentences, the translation is that of the English edition of Franz Mehring's *Karl Marx,* pp. 130-131.

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the proletariat was *not* a revolutionary force from its birth but on the contrary acquired this quality in the course of its capitalistic development.

In this connection it is necessary to recall an aspect of Marx's theory of capitalism which is of course known to all students of the subject but which, I believe, is generally considered to have mostly historical interest. This is his division of the capitalist epoch into what Engels, in his editor's preface to the first English edition of the first volume of *Capital,* called "two great and essentially different periods of economic history: the period of manufacture proper, based on the division of manual labor, and the period of modern industry based on machinery." What separated the two periods was the Industrial Revolution, a term much used by Marx, the beginning of which he dated from Wyatt's spinning machine of 1735, and which had worked its transforming effects by 1825, a year of economic crisis in which "modern industry . . . for the first time opens the periodic cycle of its modern life." (*Capital,* Kerr ed., Vol. I, p. 18.)

From our present point of view there are two fundamental differences between these phases of capitalist development. One relates to the dynamics of the production process itself, the other to the changed character of the proletariat brought about by the transition from the earlier phase to the later. (It should be noted in passing that the formal concepts of Marxian economic theory —constant and variable capital, surplus value, expanded reproduction, etc.—are equally applicable to both phases. At the level of abstraction implied by this conceptual apparatus, there is therefore no difference between the two phases, which is perhaps why many Marxist economists have failed to appreciate the importance of distinguishing between them.)

Manufacture is an extension and adaptation of age-old handicraft methods of production. The chief innovation is the assembling of many craftsmen in a single enterprise, which permits forms and degrees of specialization unthinkable under the medieval guild system. This specialization of crafts—or division of labor, as it was called by Adam Smith, the theorist *par excellence* of the manufacture phase—results in an enormous increase in labor productivity and in this sense marks a great

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stride forward in human progress. However, it is important to recognize that, technologically, manufacture is still an essentially conservative mode of production. The increase of productivity for which it is responsible stems from the more rational utilization of existing technologies, not from the introduction of new technologies. The latter process, often called invention, is no part of the logic of manufacture. Hence, in Marx's words, "History shows how the division of labor peculiar to manufacture, strictly so called, acquires the best adapted form at first by experience, as it were behind the backs of the actors, and then, like the guild handicrafts, strives to hold fast that form when once found, and here and there succeeds in keeping it for centuries." (*Ibid.*, p. 399.) This naturally does not mean that invention was absent or that the culture and ideology of this phase of capitalism did not favor the inventive arts. If such had been the case, there would have been no industrial revolution at the time and in the place where it actually occurred. What it does mean is that invention was not an integral part of the process of production and indeed was often strongly resisted by the practitioners of existing methods of production. This special combination of circumstances, both favoring and inhibiting the progress of invention, found an interesting reflection in Adam Smith who, as Nathan Rosenberg has shown,* regarded major inventions as the work of neither laborers nor capitalists but rather of "philosophers" who are totally separated from the productive process.

The labor force of the manufacturing phase corresponded to the requirements of this particular mode of production. It consisted of a multitude of craftsmen possessing a great variety of specialized skills which were characteristically passed on from father to son. Craft consciousness rather than class consciousness was the hallmark of a proletariat so composed. The skilled handworker tended to be bigoted, proud, undisciplined, contentious, capable of waging a bitter and often violent struggle against the constraints of capitalist production and the employer who imposed them upon him. But his vision was necessarily

* Nathan Rosenberg, "Adam Smith on the Division of Labor: Two Views or One?", *Economica,* May 1965.

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limited: he could not see the system as a whole nor understand his place in it, and he was therefore incapable of sustained revolutionary activity to change it. Capitalism in its manufacturing phase, in addition to being technologically conservative was also highly resistant to political and social change.

The introduction of machinery—which, according to Marx, takes place "from the moment that the tool proper is taken from man and fitted into a mechanism" (*Ibid.*, p. 408)—changed all that. Having once occurred in one important branch of industry, it literally forced itself on other branches until it finally came to dominate the mode of production as a whole. Marx's account of this process is worth quoting at some length:

> A radical change in the mode of production in one sphere of industry involves a similar change in other spheres. This happens at first in such branches of industry as are connected together by being separate phases of a process, and yet are isolated by the social division of labor in such a way that each of them produces an independent commodity. Thus spinning by machinery made weaving by machinery a necessity, and both together made the mechanical and chemical revolution that took place in bleaching, printing, and dyeing imperative. So too, on the other hand, the revolution in cotton spinning called forth the invention of the gin for separating the seeds from the cotton fibre; it was only by means of this invention that the production of cotton became possible on the enormous scale at present required. But more especially, the revolution in the modes of production of industry and agriculture made necessary a revolution in the general conditions of the social process of production, i.e. in the means of communication and transport. Hence, apart from the radical changes introduced in the construction of sailing vessels, the means of communication and transport became gradually adapted to the modes of production of mechanical industry by the creation of a system of river steamers, railways, ocean steamers, and telegraphs. But the huge masses of iron that had now to be forged, to be welded, to be cut, to be bored, and to be shaped, demanded, on their part, cyclopean machines for the construction of which the methods of the manufacturing period were utterly inadequate.
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> Modern industry had therefore itself to take in hand the machine, its characteristic instrument of production, and to construct machines by machines. It was not till it did this that it built up for itself a fitting technical foundation, and stood on its own feet. Machinery, simultaneously with the increasing use of it, in the

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first decades of this century appropriated, by degrees, the fabrication of machines proper. But it was only during the decade preceding 1866 that the construction of railways and ocean steamers on a stupendous scale called into existence the cyclopean machines now employed in the construction of prime movers. (*Ibid.*, pp. 419-420.)

Whereas capitalism in its manufacturing phase was technologically conservative and immune to the threat of revolutionary change, modern industry based on machinery is the opposite in both respects. Technological progress no longer depends on the ingenuity of the skilled worker or on the genius of the great inventor; it now becomes the province of the rational sciences. This is one of the major themes of Marx's masterful chapter entitled "Machinery and Modern Industry" which alone would be enough to mark the first volume of *Capital* as an epoch-making work. Here we must be content with a couple of brief quotations which convey the gist of his thought:

> The principle, carried out in the factory system, of analyzing the process of production into its constituent phases, and of solving the problems thus proposed by the application of mechanics, of chemistry, and of the whole range of the natural sciences, becomes the determining principle everywhere. (p. 504.)
>
> Modern Industry rent the veil that concealed from men their own social process of production, and that turned the various spontaneously divided branches of production into so many riddles, not only to outsiders but even to the initiated. The principle which it pursued of resolving each into its constituent parts without any regard to their possible execution by the hand of man, created the new modern science of technology. The varied, apparently unconnected, and petrified forms of the production process now resolved themselves into so many conscious and systematic applications of natural science to the attainment of given useful effects. (p. 532.)

From this the conclusion flowed logically: "Modern Industry never looks upon and treats the existing form of a process as final. The technical base of that industry is therefore revolutionary, while all earlier modes of production were essentially conservative." (p. 532.)

With respect to its social base, Marx regarded modern in-

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(continued from page 31)
dustrial capitalism as no less revolutionary—once again in sharp contrast to capitalism in its manufacturing phase. Machinery progressively abolishes the crafts which are the basis of manufacture and thereby renders obsolete the multitudinous special skills of the craftsmen. In this way it cheapens the labor power of adult males by obviating the need for prolonged and expensive training programs. At the same time, by putting a premium on dexterity and quickness it opens the door to the mass employment of women and children. There followed a vast expansion of the labor supply which was augmented and supplemented by two further factors: (1) Once solidly entrenched in the basic industries, machinery invades ever new branches of the economy, undercutting the old handworkers and casting them onto the labor market. And (2) the progressive improvement of machinery in industries already conquered continuously eliminates existing jobs and reduces the employment-creating power of a given rate of capital accumulation.

The effects of machinery, in short, are on the one hand to extend, homogenize, and reduce the costs of production of the labor force; on the other, to slow down the rate of increase of the demand for labor power. This means a fundamental change in the economic power relation between capital and labor, to the enormous advantage of the former. Wages are driven down to, and often below, the barest subsistence minimum; hours of work are increased beyond anything known before; the intensity of labor is stepped up to match the ever increasing speed of the machinery. Machinery thus completes the process, begun in the period of primitive accumulation, of subjecting labor to the sway of capital. It is the capitalistic employment of machinery, and not merely capitalism in general, which generates the modern proletariat as Marx conceived it.

But the coin has two sides. Economically, the power of the proletariat under modern industry is much reduced compared to that of its predecessor in the period of manufacture. But politically, its potential power is infinitely greater. Old craft and geographical divisions and jealousies are eliminated or minimized. The nature of work in the modern factory requires the

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organization and disciplining of the workers, thereby preparing them for organized and disciplined action in other fields. The extreme of exploitation to which they are subjected deprives them of any interest in the existing social order, forces them to live in conditions in which morality is meaningless and family life impossible, and ends by totally alienating them from their work, their products, their society, and even themselves. Unlike the skilled craftsmen of the period of manufacture, these workers form a proletariat which is both capable of, and has every interest in, revolutionary action to overthrow the existing social order. These are the ones of whom Marx and Engels had already declared in the *Communist Manifesto*: "The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win." In the first volume of *Capital* this bold generalization is supported by a painstaking analysis of the immanent features and tendencies of capitalist "modern industry" as it emerged from the industrial revolution.

So far I have tried to show that Marx's theory of capitalism encompasses two quite distinct phases, separated by the industrial revolution, which can be characterized as follows:

Manufacture	
Technology	Conservative
Proletariat	Non-revolutionary
Modern Industry	
Technology	Revolutionary
Proletariat	Revolutionary

It must be immediately added, however, that the word "revolutionary" applied to technology has a somewhat different meaning from what it does when applied to the proletariat. A revolutionary technology is one which by its very nature changes continuously and rapidly; a revolutionary proletariat, on the other hand, is one which has the *potential* to make a revolution but which can actually make it only once under favorable conditions (the so-called revolutionary situation). Here a question obviously arises: If, for whatever reason, the emergence of a revolutionary situation is long delayed, what will be the effect

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in the meantime of modern industry's revolutionary technology on the composition and capabilities of the proletariat?

Marx never asked this question, perhaps because it never occurred to him that the revolution might be long delayed. And yet it is a question which arises quite naturally within the framework of his theory. He had explicitly recognized that modern industry "is continually causing changes not only in the technical basis of production, but also in the functions of the laborer and in the labor-process" (*Ibid.*, p. 533); and no one knew better than he that it is the functions of the laborer and the nature of the labor process which determine the character of the proletariat. In the absence of a revolutionary situation, would the proletariat tend to become more or less revolutionary? It would have been a perfectly logical question for Marx to ask when he was writing *Capital;* a hundred years later it seems to be not only a logical but an inescapable question for Marx's followers.

This is obviously not the occasion to attempt a comprehensive answer, and I have to admit that my knowledge of the interrelation between technology and the labor process is far too limited to permit me to speak as an expert on the subject. I will therefore restrict myself to indicating in a very general way why it seems to me that the advance of modern technology must tend to shape a proletariat which is less rather than more revolutionary than that which emerged from the industrial revolution in the middle of the 19th century.

I would not put the main emphasis on the consequences of technological change for the workers who actually mind the machines and do functionally similar work, much of it virtually unknown in Marx's time, such as manning assembly lines. These are still for the most part dehumanizing jobs requiring little skill; and speed-up of machinery and increasing work loads certainly do not make them more bearable, not to say attractive. A proletariat dominated by operatives of this general description might well have as great a revolutionary potential as its mid-19th-century predecessor. The point is that relative to the total work force there are so many fewer jobs of this kind than there used to be. Progressive mechanization of particular

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processes, and more recently the perfection of generally applicable methods of partial or full automation, have reduced this traditional blue-collar segment of the proletariat from what was once a large majority to what is today in the most industrialized societies a small minority. Since the output of this minority has at the same time enormously increased, it is clear that modern technology has multiplied the productivity of labor many times over and put within society's grasp a potential surplus of vast proportions.

The obverse of this development is that a great variety of new categories of jobs has been created. Some of these are integrally related to the new technology—scientists, researchers, engineers, technicians, highly skilled maintenance and repair men, etc.—but many more (both absolutely and relatively) are concerned in one way or another with the manipulation and absorption of the surplus made possible by the increased productivity of the underlying production workers. Under this heading one could list government workers of all kinds, including teachers; those employed in the many branches of the sales apparatus, including most of the personnel of the mass communication media; workers and salaried personnel in finance, insurance, and real estate; and the providers of many different kinds of personal services from beauty treatment to sports spectacles. In the United States today these job categories, taken all together, probably account for close to three quarters of the employed non-agricultural labor force.

In terms of the occupational composition of the labor force, then, the two chief consequences of modern industry's revolutionary technology have been (1) a drastic (and continuing) reduction in the production-worker component, and (2) a vast proliferation of job categories in the distribution and service sectors of the economy. At the same time there has taken place a slow but cumulatively substantial increase in the real wages of both production and non-production workers. In part this reflects an increase in the cost of production of labor power as the educational and training requirements of the new employment categories have risen. And in part it reflects the fact that the workers—and here we mean primarily production workers—

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have been able through non-revolutionary class struggle to wrest from the capitalists a part of the fruits of increasing productivity.

To sum up: The revolutionary technology of modern industry, correctly described and analyzed by Marx,* has had the effect of multiplying by many times the productivity of basic production workers. This in turn has resulted in a sharp reduction in their relative importance in the labor force, in the proliferation of new job categories, and in a gradually rising standard of living for employed workers. In short, the first effects of the introduction of machinery—expansion and homogenization of the labor force and reduction in the costs of production (value) or labor power—have been largely reversed. Once again, as in the period of manufacture, the proletariat is highly differentiated; and once again occupational and status consciousness has tended to submerge class consciousness.

It might be thought that despite these changes the blue-collar proletariat would remain a revolutionary element within the working class as a whole. No doubt there is a tendency for this to happen, and it would be short-sighted in the extreme to overlook the revolutionary potential still remaining in this large body of workers. But one must not go too far in isolating them from the rest of the labor force. As James Boggs says: "Today most workers in the plant [i.e. blue-collar workers] have been to high school and quite a few have even been to college. All either plan or wish to send their sons and daughters to college—their sons so they won't have to work in the factory on what they call a dull and automated job; their daughters . . . so they won't have to marry some bum but can make their own living and be free to decide whether they want to marry or not marry. . . ." (*The American Revolution,* p. 14.) In other words, blue-collar workers, being a diminishing minority of the whole working class, do not think of their families as permanently stuck in the stratum which they occupy. As long as this is so, their attitudes and ideology are not likely to be radically dif-

* As a matter of fact Marx's treatment of the relations among industry, technology, and science was far ahead of his time and has only become fully realistic and applicable a hundred years later.

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ferent from those of the non-revolutionary majority of the working class which surrounds them.

If we accept these general propositions about the direct and indirect effects of modern technology on the composition and character of the working class, must we conclude that Marx's theory of the proletariat has been refuted? I do not think so. His theory in fact dealt with the early impact of machinery on the proletariat, not with the longer-run consequences of the machine technology for the proletariat. One might perhaps complain that Marx did not attempt to develop a more comprehensive theory; and one could argue, I think persuasively, that he certainly could have done so. Indeed from many remarks scattered throughout his writings, it would probably be possible for a follower of Marx to construct a more or less systematic theory of what the future held in store for the proletariat if capitalism should survive the revolutionary threat inherent in the early period of modern industry. But this is not the occasion for such an effort, and the fact that Marx himself did not make it provides no justification for denying the validity of the theory he did put forward within the limits of its applicability.

In this connection I would go further and argue that the Russian Revolution of 1917 provides extremely strong empirical evidence for the validity of Marx's theory. This revolution occurred in a capitalist country where modern industry was in the process of establishing itself and where it had already created a large and highly revolutionary urban proletariat. Under these circumstances, when the revolutionary situation matured (as it had not done in the Western European countries at a comparable stage of development), the proletariat played precisely the role attributed to it in Marx's theory. In the social sciences, a theory rarely receives a more striking confirmation.

Here, however, a much more serious question arises: Does the fact that capitalism in Western Europe and North America survived the initial period of modern industry and that its new technology then went on progressively to reduce the revolutionary potential of the proletariat, mean that as of the second half of the 20th century we have to abandon the whole idea of a revolutionary agent destined to overthrow the capitalist order?

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Again, I do not think so.

The belief that the *industrial* proletariat is the only possible revolutionary agent under capitalism stems from focusing attention too exclusively on the advanced capitalist countries where modern industry got its start and where the new technology has had a chance to develop under favorable conditions. But capitalism as a social order has never consisted only of industrialized countries. In fact, as Marx explicitly recognized, the industrialization of some countries had as its counterpart from the outset the non-industrialization of others, with the two sets of countries being integrally tied together in a single system.

> So soon . . . as the general conditions requisite for production by the modern industrial system have been established, this mode of production acquires an elasticity, a capacity for sudden extension by leaps and bounds that finds no hindrance except in the supply of raw material and in the disposal of the produce. On the one hand, the immediate effect of machinery is to increase the supply of raw material in the same way, for example, as the cotton gin augmented the production of cotton. On the other hand, the cheapness of the articles produced by machinery, and the improved means of transport and communications furnish the weapons for conquering foreign markets. By ruining handicraft production in other countries, machinery forcibly converts them into fields for the supply of its raw material. In this way East India was compelled to produce cotton, wool, hemp, jute, and indigo for Great Britain. . . . A new and international division of labor, a division suited to the requirements of the chief centers of modern industry springs up, and converts one part of the globe into a chiefly agricultural field of production for supplying the other part which remains a chiefly industrial field. (*Capital,* Vol. I, pp. 492-493.)

Once it is recognized that capitalism is not and never has been confined to one or more industrializing countries, but is rather a global system embracing both the (relatively few) industrializing countries and their (relatively numerous) satellites and dependencies, it becomes quite clear that the future of the system cannot be adequately analyzed in terms of the forces at work in any part of the system but must take full account of the *modus operandi* of the system as a whole.

Lenin was the first Marxist to see this and to begin work on the theoretical extensions and reformulations which it made

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necessary. His major contribution was his little book *Imperialism: the Highest Stage of Capitalism* which, having been published in 1917, is exactly half as old as the first volume of *Capital.* There he argued that "Capitalism has grown into a world system of colonial oppression and of the financial strangulation of the overwhelming majority of the people of the world by a handful of 'advanced' countries. And this 'booty' is shared between two or three powerful world pirates armed to the teeth. . . ." He also argued that the capitalists of the imperialist countries could and do use a part of their "booty" to bribe and win over to their side an aristocracy of labor. As far as the logic of the argument is concerned, it could be extended to a majority or even all the workers in the industrialized countries. In any case it is clear that taking account of the global character of the capitalist system provides strong additional reasons for believing that the tendency in this stage of capitalist development will be to generate a less rather than a more revolutionary proletariat.

But once again the coin has two sides. If imperialist exploitation brings wealth to the industrialized countries and enables them to raise further the standard of living of their working classes, it brings poverty and misery to the great mass of the working people—agricultural as well as industrial—in the dependencies. These masses now become an agent of revolutionary change in precisely the sense that Marx believed the industrial proletariat of the mid-19th century to be. Let me quote again what he wrote in the *Holy Family*: "Because the abstraction of all humanity, even the appearance of humanity, is practically complete in the fully developed proletariat, because the living conditions of the proletariat represent the focal point of all inhuman conditions in contemporary society, because the human being is lost in the proletariat, but has won a theoretical consciousness of loss and is compelled by unavoidable and absolutely compulsory need . . . to revolt against this inhumanity—all these are the reasons why the proletariat can and must emancipate itself."

These words certainly do not apply to the working classes of the United States and Western Europe today. But do they

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not apply all the more obviously and forcefully to the masses in the much more numerous and populous underdeveloped dependencies of the global capitalist system? And does not the pattern of successful socialist revolutions since the Second World War—highlighted by Vietnam, China, and Cuba—demonstrate beyond any doubt that these masses do indeed constitute a revolutionary agent capable of challenging and defeating capitalism?

Allow me in conclusion to present a very brief summary of my thesis: In Marx's theory of capitalism, the proletariat is not always and necessarily revolutionary. It was not revolutionary in the period of manufacture, becoming so only as a consequence of the introduction of machinery in the industrial revolution. The long-run effects of machinery, however, are different from the immediate effects. If the revolutionary opportunities of the early period of modern industry are missed, the proletariat of an industrializing country tends to become less and less revolutionary. This does not mean, however, that Marx's contention that capitalism produces its own gravediggers is wrong. If we consider capitalism as a global system, which is the only correct procedure, we see that it is divided into a handful of exploiting countries and a much more numerous and populous group of exploited countries. The masses in these exploited dependencies constitute a force in the global capitalist system which is revolutionary in the same sense and for the same reasons that Marx considered the proletariat of the early period of modern industry to be revolutionary. And finally, world history since the Second World War proves that this revolutionary force is really capable of waging successful revolutionary struggles against capitalist domination.

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—*Rev. Frederick Brown Harris, D.D. Opening Session of the United States Senate, January 10, 1967*

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—*From an official statement by the African National Union, Kenya's ruling political party*

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HOW TO SPREAD THE WORD

BY LEO HUBERMAN

In the late 1930's I sat in on a course of education for trade unionists. That these workers had a desire to learn was evident by their enrollment in a class held in the evenings, after they had done a day's work. That the teacher knew his subject was manifest from the brilliance of his lecture. That the combination of students' desire and teacher's grasp of the material did not result in learning was obvious from the fact that before the hour was over, several members of the class were asleep; it was apparent, too, from the decline in enrollment—the next class was attended by only half the students, and the third time the class met, less than a quarter who had signed up were in attendance.

This, by and large, has been the experience in trade union education in the United States. Union officials, badgered by the pleas of the education director to appropriate the small sum needed for trade union classes, finally yield, reluctantly. The classes are held, and they fizzle. The union officials then declare triumphantly, "See, the workers don't want to learn." The teacher, saddened by his experience, agrees. But the conclusion is totally wrong: it isn't that the workers do not want to learn—that is seldom the case. The cause of the failure is that *the teacher does not know how to teach.*

This experience is not unique to trade union classes. It happens with radical groups, too. And it happens in underdeveloped countries where revolutionary ardor fills new classrooms with enthusiastic workers and peasants—and poor teaching, just as quickly, empties those classrooms.

This need not happen. Workers and peasants, no matter how impoverished their previous educational background, will stay the course, and they will learn, if the teaching they get is good teaching.

This article, plus an earlier one entitled *Notes On Left Propaganda,* will be published as a pamphlet by Monthly Review Press.

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What is good teaching? What did that teacher in the trade union class do wrong? He had talked for about ten minutes when a hand went up and a student asked a question. It was a thoughtful question. The teacher should have felt flattered—he had said something which had stimulated one of his listeners to think. He should have felt like hugging the questioner—instead, he was annoyed. The smooth flow of his carefully planned lecture had been interrupted and he put off the questioner with "I'll come to that later."

His mistake was in being concerned only with subject matter; he should have been concerned with students. He was a lecturer, not a teacher. The lecturer teaches subject matter; the teacher teaches people. The difference is crucial.

Obviously, where classes are very large and the lecturer stands before so many faces that he cannot possibly know them as individual human beings, good teaching by my definition, is not feasible. Here the lecturer does his job well if he masters his material and presents it in as lively a manner as possible. But that trade union class had only 17 students and in a class that size (up to a limit of 25) it is easy for the teacher to get to know his students as individual human beings with varying backgrounds, and good teaching is possible.

It is possible because the teacher can base his lesson on the background and experience of the students and, by skillful questioning, get them to participate in the learning process. The subject matter is no longer an end in itself but a vehicle for making the students think, for giving them tools for understanding the world and their position in it. From the lecture hall, students emerge with a body of information; from a good classroom discussion in which they have participated actively because the subject matter is keyed to their experience, students emerge with an analytical approach to problems, with a comprehenson of underlying forces.

The subject of the first lesson in that trade union course was an introduction to the capitalist system. As I said above, the teacher gave a brilliant lecture beginning with feudalism, the change to capitalism, the words of Karl Marx, exploitation of

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the working class, the whole bit. But he wasn't *teaching,* he was *telling*. He was telling the working class in words what it had experienced in life, instead of drawing from that experience the analysis he wanted the students to make.

Here below is a summary outline of the way the same subject was taught to a group of trade unionists in a workers' summer school. It should be noted that in this class and those that followed, no one went to sleep, the lively discussion was enjoyed by both teacher and students, the students were enthusiastic about the school, and tests showed that they had, in fact, learned what was taught them.

No tape recording of the class session is available so it should be understood that the questions and answers are only a fragment of the whole, listed merely to show the approach, to give the flavor of the discussion, to clarify the technique.

Questions	*Answers*
Where do you work?	• Students give the names of the companies where they are employed. (This question serves the additional purpose of helping the teacher to get to know his students and the students to know each other in their first meeting.)
Why do you work?	• Have to work in order to live. • Can't eat without working. • Just gotta get that dough each week to pay the rent.
Does the man who owns the factory work alongside you?	• (Laughter) That'll be the day. • I've never seen him. • My plant is owned by a big corporation.
Have you ever seen the stockholders of the corporation working in the plant?	• No, they don't work there. • Of course not.

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But you all agreed you *had* to work in order to live; now you tell me there are some people who live without working. How come?

- They don't have to work because they own the factory.
- They get profits from the business.

Then there are two groups of people in our society. One group, to which you belong, lives by.....? And the other group to which your employer belongs lives by...?

- Working.
- Owning.

(Teacher writes on blackboard)
2 groups
Workers — live by working
Employers — live by owning

Have you always had work?

- Yes.
- I was laid off for five months once.
- My factory was closed during the depression for over a year.

Mary says her plant was closed down for over a year. But she works in a textile mill. Didn't people need the shirts her mill turned out? And Henry's refrigerator plant, he tells us, was shut down for five months; didn't people want refrigerators any more?

- Sure, people needed shirts but they couldn't pay for them because they didn't have any money, so the boss had to shut the mill down.
- When Henry's boss couldn't sell his refrigerators, he closed the plant.
- If I were him I'd have done the same thing. He's gotta make a profit or he must go out of business.

You mean to say that even though people needed shirts and wanted refrigerators, unless the owner made a profit, he closed up?

- Yes, he's in business to make money.
- If he doesn't make money, he shuts down the plant.
- It doesn't matter if he's a good guy or bad guy, unless

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he makes a profit, he has to close up.

What you are saying, then, is that in our system of production, goods will be produced only if there is a profit?

- That's right.
- Unless there's a profit, there's no production.

Was that always true?

- Guess so.
- No, there was a time when people made what they needed for themselves, when they needed it.

Why don't they make shirts, and refrigerators, and washing machines, and autos for themselves now?

- Don't have the money.
- You need factories and raw materials and expensive equipment to make the things people want nowadays.

Let's sum up what we have discussed so far. You say that in our system of production there are 2 groups (teacher points to blackboard):

Workers — live by working
Employers — live by owning

The employers live by owning (teacher writes on blackboard)

The employers own:

the factories
equipment, machinery } the means of production
raw materials

The employers own what is necessary to produce goods in our society. This system of production is called (teacher writes on blackboard)

CAPITALISM
Object — not to produce goods as needed
but
to make a profit

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Now let's continue. The owners of the means of production, the employers, are also called capitalists. Which of the two groups, workers or capitalists, have more power? Why?

- The bosses have the most power because they have more money.
- The capitalists have the most power because if they don't give you a job, you can't pay your bills.
- The capitalists have the most power because if you don't work you starve, if they don't work they've got enough money to live on.

What gives them more power?

- They own the means of production.

Which group has the most power with the government? Let me answer that question by reading a quotation from a book written a long time ago: "The facts of the situation amount to this: that a comparatively small number of men control the raw material of this country; that a comparatively small number of men control the water power . . . that the same number of men largely control the railroads; that by agreements handed around among themselves they control prices, and that same group of men control the larger credits of the country. . . . *The masters of the government of the United States are the combined capitalists and manufacturers of the United States.*"

The man who wrote that was in a position to know. He was President of the United States

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when he wrote it. His name was Woodrow Wilson.

In our next lesson, we will discuss what the working class can do to protect itself from the power of the capitalist class.

It is apparent from this lesson that a discussion does not mean merely aimless talk leading here, there, and everywhere. The good teacher must know his subject as well as the lecturer; he must have the same mastery of his material but, in addition, he must give thought to the best way of presenting it in terms of the experience of his students. He must have a lesson plan. This does not mean such strict adherence to his plan that he won't be quick to pick up and pursue this or that interesting point arising from the students' response—but it does mean that he must not be sidetracked indefinitely. His lesson must have a beginning, a middle, and an end. He must know before the discussion begins the basic points he is going to make and he must make them.

A key point to remember is that the discussion must never be allowed to become a dialogue between teacher and a student with the other students feeling that they need not listen until a question is directed specifically to them. The students must listen carefully to other student responses as well as to teacher questions. There are techniques for establishing this continual participation. "Do you agree with what John just said, Philip? No? Then what's your answer to the question?"

In this connection, the good teacher never makes the mistake of calling upon students in order. When the first question is directed to Student A, the next to Student B, and the next to Student C, there is no need for Student Z to pay any attention because he knows precisely when he will be invited to participate; until that moment arrives the discussion can become irrelevant to him.

There is an even more important reason for not calling upon students in a set order. The good teacher is concerned

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less with subject matter than with the people he is teaching. He wants them to learn to think. If he is alert and has done his job well, all the students will have participated in the discussion before it is over and he will then be aware of their background and capabilities. He will *know* his students, and consequently he can direct questions to them in accordance with their varying ability. The easy questions will go to the less able students—it is important for them to get a feeling of accomplishment—and the more difficult, more subtle questions will be directed to the brighter students—they must be extended to the utmost or they will lose interest.

The good teacher never teaches a lesson without using the blackboard, and he should insist that the basic points he writes on the blackboard should be recorded by the students in a notebook, along with other notes they choose to take themselves. There is a sound reason for the blackboard and the notebook: some people learn by hearing; some people learn by seeing; some people learn only by using their muscles; and almost everybody learns best by a combination of all three. Thus, the discussion itself will be suited to those who learn by hearing; the basic points on the blackboard will help those who learn by seeing; and writing in the notebook will drive the points home for those who must use their muscles to learn. The notebook with the fundamentals of each lesson therein recorded, will be of use to the student for review purposes and, for the brightest ones, it can become a tool for teaching others when the need arises. And the need already exists for more classes for workers, newcomers to the radical movement, and peasants in the underdeveloped countries.

We should not forget that our tradition is one of protest and revolt, and it is stultifying to celebrate the rebels of the past . . . while we silence the rebels of the present.

—Henry Steele Commager, Freedom, Loyalty, Dissent

Is it not remarkable that the greatest atrocities of life—I think of the capitalistic system and of the war—can justify themselves on purely moral principles? The devil may also make use of morality.

—Karl Barth, The Word of God and the Word of Man, 1958

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BOOKS

THE ROLE OF THE AMERICAN WORKING CLASS

BY STAUGHTON LYND

American Disciples of Marx: From the Age of Jackson to the Progressive Era, by David Herreshoff. Wayne State University Press, Detroit, 1967; $7.95.

This is one of the most thoughtful and impressive books ever written about the history of American radicalism. Ostensibly its subject is the attempt of four men—Orestes Brownson, Joseph Weydemeyer, Friedrich Sorge, Daniel DeLeon—to apply Marxism to American conditions. But for David Herreshoff, an assistant professor of English at Wayne State University, this collective intellectual biography serves as a vehicle to explore certain perennial problems in the strategic thinking of radical Americans. Every sentence in the book bears the marks of a struggle to know "What is to be done?" in the present moment. In this struggle Professor Herreshoff's students have evidently played their part; for *American Disciples of Marx* is dedicated in part to "my advisees of the Wayne State Afro-American Action Committee, Committee to End the War in Vietnam, Friends of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, Students for a Democratic Society, W.E.B. Du Bois Club, and Young Socialist Alliance."

The skeleton of Herreshoff's argument may be summarized as follows: "There is a strong and broad American radical tradition older than Marxism." That tradition understands its goal as the completion or fulfilment of the American Revolution. The movement toward that end has had four principal components, "the labor movement—made up of unions, cooperatives, and workers' parties—and the farmers', women's, and Negro movements." Regret-

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Staughton Lynd, professor of history at Chicago State College, is the author of *Nonviolence in America: A Documentary History,* and, scheduled for early publication, *Intellectual Origins of American Radicalism.*

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tably all of these egalitarian movements have been self-centered. "If two or more of them made common cause they would likely be a shaping force in American politics. On a large scale this has never happened. . . ." Until the close of the 19th century the principle obstacle to an American revolutionary movement was the "agrarian bent" of native American radical thought, sustained by the availability of Western land. In the 20th century the conservatism of "an anti-socialist, reformist labor movement" has been the chief problem of Marxism in the United States.

Herreshoff well emphasizes that this problem is not exceptional to America. "The Marxist failure to radicalize the labor movement by extending its aims used to be regarded as a peculiarly American phenomenon." At the turn of the century, accordingly, Werner Sombart and others speculated as to why a strong socialist movement had failed to develop in the United States. But as Herreshoff observes, the collapse of European Social Democracy in 1914 suggests that the real difficulty is "Western exceptionalism": the failure of socialism to take power in *any* mature industrial society.

> . . . ever since European socialism capitulated to European nationalism in 1914, the weakness of the socialist movement in the United States has appeared less and less to be American exceptionalism. American labor radicals who worked to make America's labor movement resemble Europe's, have had their hopes realized, in a most ironic way. The labor movements of Europe and the United States have arrived at a common ideology. It is not a socialist ideology; it is more anti-communist than anti-capitalist. Its goal is the welfare state. The reform of capitalism, the military budget, and the cold war are the articles of its common creed.

This turn of events is the more depressing in that, as Herreshoff rightly argues, Marxism and American Transcendental radicalism had "common intellectual origins." On intellectual grounds there was no insuperable difficulty to transplanting Marxism to America. But the objective difficulties have been formidable. Before the Civil War there was the question of whether to oppose slavery and make a temporary peace with capitalism until abolition was achieved, or whether to attack capitalism with Southern slaveholders as possible allies. Herreshoff treats the career of Orestes Brownson from the standpoint of this strategic problem. "Since Brownson many American labor radicals have been gored by the dilemma of the lesser evil: how to deal with the enemies of their enemies. Perennially, this dilemma has fragmented American radical move-

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ments." Brownson's decision to make peace with the Southern wing of the Democratic party appears in hindsight deeply mistaken. But Brownson assessed more accurately than Marx how little the Civil War would radicalize American society. "You will never make the mass of the white people look upon the blacks as their equals," wrote Brownson in 1863. Two years later he commented that, with slavery gone, "there is no social grievance of magnitude enough to enlist any considerable number of people."

Both before and after the Civil War those who sought to build a Marxist movement in America had to deal with the grievances of small farmers. "Like all nineteenth-century Marxists . . . Weydemeyer was against parcelling out government lands to small farmers." Sorge, too, opposed William Sylvis when the latter led the National Labor Union toward "the traditional agrarian insistence on cheap money"; and De Leon, after initial adherence to Henry George, refused coalition with the Populists in the 1890's. Since radical political movements in the period 1865-1900 were all based on the small farmer, American Marxists found themselves championing trade union work against electoral action. The ironic result was that the American Federation of Labor's doctrine of abstention from politics "had its origin in the attitude of the American Marxists toward middle-class reform politics during the period of Sorge's leadership."

In the 1890's there finally came about that closing of the frontier which Marxists had long anticipated. But no more than the end of slavery did this event usher in a period of deepening strife between capital and labor.

The labor movement in which the Marxists of Sorge's generation worked was unstable and open to radical influences. They felt the rivalry of other radicalisms—feminism and agrarianism in particular—far more than they did the rivalry of a conservative, non-socialist trend in the unions. But after 1890 an anti-socialist, reformist labor movement became the most important factor in the national environment of American Marxists.

The greatness of Daniel De Leon, as portrayed by Herreshoff, lay in the single-minded dedication and intelligence with which he pursued this problem from his joining the Socialist Labor Party in 1890 until his death in 1914.

The hard-line dogmatism for which De Leon has been so

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richly chastised by historians of both Left and Right bore good fruit until the end of the 1890's. The SLP vote mounted throughout the decade. Herreshoff comments incisively:

If the statistics did not suggest that the SLP was on the verge of becoming a major party, they did suggest that the hard line toward Populism was no disaster for the SLP, and they projected a pattern of relations between a broad reform party and an outriding party of revolution which would be retraced in succeeding decades. Populism and the SLP grew simultaneously in the nineties; La Follette Progressivism and the Socialist party grew simultaneously in the first dozen years of the twentieth century, and so did the New Deal and the Communist party in the thirties.

De Leon's "dogmatism" appeared to particular advantage during the war with Spain, when his line was firmly anti-war and internationalist, while socialists such as W. J. Ghent and Victor Berger found reasons to support the war. Later, during the American occupation of the Philippines, De Leon clearly sensed (in Herreshoff's paraphrase) that "suicidal imperialism was the alternative to socialism."

De Leon is most open to criticism for his support of "dual unionism." But Herreshoff argues that the successful organization of the American Railway Union, the Western Federation of Miners and the Amalgamated Clothing Workers demonstrates that the creation of new unions outside the AF of L was unjustifiable. The difficulty was that De Leon expected the new unions to be socialist. But in this he was no more blind than was his master Marx, who referred to day-to-day trade union activity as "these unavoidable guerrilla fights." In contrast to both Brownson and Sorge, De Leon favored what Herreshoff terms an "organic approach" to politics: "simultaneous attacks on various forms of oppression." For him "an organic politics was in resonance with a revolutionary age, while an orderly concentration on one objective at a time was better suited to an age of evolutionary gradualism." De Leon overestimated the ripeness of his time for revolution. His perception that in a time of revolution the oppressed must avoid alliances and build their own institutions so as to develop self-reliance, remains valid; indeed as a strategy it anticipated the kernel of "black power."

In a concluding chapter called "Perspectives," Herreshoff emphasizes that, with the exception of Sorge, the men and movements

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described in *American Disciples* regarded labor radicalism "as a movement to redeem the promise of the American Revolution." De Leon, for example, protested "the debunking of the founding fathers by economic determinist historians like A. M. Simons and Charles Beard. Had all the talk of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness been only a façade for bourgeois self-seeking? Only 'dry-as-dust dogmatists, whose Socialism goes by rote' would think so." In contrast even to De Leon the subsequent American Communist Party was a "colonial phenomenon" rather than "an interaction between Marxism and the American environment." Thus

to the extent that it was at war with the American social order the CP tended toward exoticism; to the extent that it adapted itself to the American environment it tended to obliterate itself. The feat of being American and radical at the same time seemed beyond its strength.

If Herreshoff disappoints at all it is at the very end, and then only by not saying more. "Every American generation since the eighteen-twenties has witnessed a significant expression of labor radicalism. It seems likely that there will be new expressions of it and that labor radicalism will be one of the forms of revolt to attract the generation now of college age." This concluding observation does not deal adequately with the argument of many young radical scholars (see, for example, "The Decline of American Radicalism in the Twentieth Century," by Gabriel Kolko, *Studies On The Left,* September-October 1966) that the industrial proletariat has not played and will not play the revolutionary role which Marx assigned to it. Herreshoff's own evidence would appear to support this conclusion rather than the more optimistic note on which he ends his book.

Perhaps Herreshoff will permit me to come to his defense by adding, so to speak, one more page to his book, directed to the question: Under what circumstances might American industrial workers play a revolutionary role?

One begins with the observation that the conservatism of the American working class in the 20th century is not altogether contrary to Marxism. Lenin's theory of imperialism provides a rough-and-ready guide as to why 20th-century revolutions have occurred at the edges rather than at the center of world capitalism. Could one add to Lenin's theory of imperialism what has not yet been written, an adequate Marxist analysis of fascism and the strategy

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of anti-fascist resistance, I believe one would begin to possess a theoretical framework in which an active part for industrial workers was not excluded. Undoubtedly Negroes, not workers as such, will constitute the American revolutionary vanguard. But this does not mean it is inevitable that white workingmen will be on the wrong side of the barricades.

The important point is to recognize that American radicalism in the next generation will not come into being on the Social Democratic model, as a gradual achievement of one reform after another, but will be essentially a defensive reaction to increased domestic oppression growing out of reverses for the American establishment overseas, and the simultaneous threat to the American establishment from the black ghettos within the United States. Of the discrete egalitarian movements catalogued by Herrshoff, two already exist: the black liberation movement, and the movement of students and other young people focussed on resistance to the draft. These two movements have not been "self-centered." They have worked together, as exemplified by the cooperation of SNCC and SDS, articulating similar goals and proceeding on the basis of much the same theory. As domestic oppression increases, other groups in the population will be radicalized. Offended by the erosion of accustomed freedoms, the intellectual community and professionals of the "new working class" will be pushed from protest to resistance. And industrial workers, as I see it, may once more become militant when their very right to collective existence —the right to strike—is threatened.

Industrial workers were militant enough in the United States when striking for the right to form unions. It may be true, as Selig Perlman concluded and the Wobblies feared, that once labor achieves union recognition it tends toward conservatism. No matter; a concerted attack by American capitalism on union independence, on the right to strike, would reproduce the conditions which gave rise to Homestead, Pullman, and the sit-down at Flint. Under those circumstances the "organic politics" of De Leon might become altogether appropriate.

Those who won our independence by revolution were not cowards. They did not fear political change. They did not exalt order at the cost of liberty.

—*Justice Brandeis, Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927)*

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american disciples of marx:

from the Age of Jackson to the Progressive Era

by David Herreshoff

This book is an account of the first Marxists in America: Orestes Brownson, Joseph Weydemeyer, Friedrich Sorge, and Daniel De Leon, among others. Beginning with the arrival here of German radicals, it deals with the way in which Marx's ideas were interpreted and modified in the United States from about 1848 to the beginning of the twentieth century. Mr. Herreshoff is concerned with not only the impact of Marxism on America but also the effect of America on Marxism.

David Herreshoff is assistant professor of English at Wayne State University. A graduate of the University of Akron and the University of Minnesota, he has published essays on labor radicalism and poems in numerous journals. *216 pages $7.95.*

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WORLD EVENTS

By Scott Nearing

Nothing Changes?

There is a famous French saying, designed to throw dust in the eyes of revolutionaries and to console disinherited social parasites: "The more things change the more they remain as they were." In other words, nothing changes. No slogan could be more mendacious or fallacious.

Change appears to be continuous in time and universal in extent. Everything changes, constantly. This generalization takes on added significance in an epoch of revolutionary change like the period through which the culture of the entire planet is presently passing.

We, in the industrialized, modernized West, tend to look to undeveloped cultures for change and consider our own culture as a model of stability and security; yet within living memory the proletarian revolution, stumbling over the heels of the receding bourgeois revolution, has led to spectacular changes in our thinking, doing, and living.

For three decades, from 1917 to 1945, there had been only one nation, the Soviet Union, seriously engaged in building socialism. Following the war, the nations building socialism increased from one to a dozen—located chiefly in Eastern Europe and Asia. In addition to this dozen builders of socialism, there was another dozen, headed by Britain, India, Indonesia, that talked openly and loudly about building socialism the peaceful, orderly, Fabian way—legally, gradually, step by step.

Immediately after the war, the floodgates of colonial insurrection were pushed open. Out of Asia and Africa particularly arose a babel of ex-colonial voices demanding independence from imperial fetters and an open door to self-determination and the establishment of political, economic, and social institutions that would modernize former colonial areas and equip them with the facilities necessary to shape their own destinies.

There was much official talk, in the earlier postwar years,

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of the probability or possibility that the Soviet Union might overrun Central and Western Europe and move to the English Channel. On the basis of this assumed threat Washington set about organizing a defense apparatus, headed by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which actually included the remnants of the major 19th century empires, with local, subsidiary organizations such as the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization and the Central Treaty Organization.

The Leap to Asia

Once the balance had been struck, with the NATO powers headed by the United States in control of the planetary airways, seaways, and channels of communication, the Washington government launched its drive to reconquer Asia for the imperialists. This drive was implemented by placing the United States defense perimeter on the Asian side of the Pacific Ocean in the island chain running from Alaska to Singapore. This chain of islands, including the Japanese islands, the Philippines, and Formosa (legally part of China), was to be a defensive barrier protecting North America against the yellow hordes from Asia. Equally, it was a base of operations from which Washington speedily launched the Korean War of 1950-1953 which gave the United States its first foothold on the Northeast Asian mainland. The Vietnamese War, greatly expanded after 1962, aimed to secure for Washington a similar position on the Southeast Asian mainland. Meantime, Taiwan (Formosa) was seized in 1950 and converted into an island fortress at the strategic center of the island chain. In 1965 a well organized, financed, and armed coup was directed against the duly elected government of Indonesia. The government was overthrown, a wholesale massacre of Communists and other subversives was begun, and Indonesia, with its hundred million people, ceased its efforts at socialist construction and became a leader among the Asian nations engaged in the anti-Communist crusade.

War, revolution, and empire building tumbled over one another in the Asian act of the Cold War drama. The center of action so long located in Europe had shifted to Asia. These

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momentous happenings, following on the heels of the 1936-1945 war, involved a shift of the world power struggle from the Atlantic to the Pacific—marking the downgrading of Europe and the upgrading of Asia as the center of the world power conflict.

In a few paragraphs I have tried to sketch one momentous change in the pattern of current history. Each year and each epoch bring their quotas of change, adding them to the accumulated volumes of contemporary history. There are times, such as the period from 1815 to 1945, when one continent, Europe, holds the center of the world stage. Then new actors enter and the scene of the drama shifts halfway around the planet, to North America and Asia. Such a shift is taking place before our eyes.

The Collapse of Capitalist Imperialism?

In the 19th century wealth and power were centered in Europe. Specifically, they were in the hands of British, French, Dutch, Spanish, Italian, Belgian, Russian, and German empire builders. At the end of the Napoleonic wars in 1815 and all through the ensuing hundred years until 1914, this European hierarchy of productivity, accumulated wealth, and political authority (backed by navies and armies) ruled the planet. This was the structured pattern of western civilization during the 19th century.

When I write that British, French, and other groups of European empire builders ruled the planet during the 19th century I do not refer to the British, French, and other peoples. Each European nucleus of empire was ruled by a tiny minority which owned land and capital and said the last word when decisions were made on questions of national policy. Even at the beginning of the present century, say in 1910, the people in the European empire centers had little or no voice in deciding issues of war and peace, as was clearly revealed by the outbreak of general war in July, 1914.

Even if the peoples of Europe had been deciding public policy in 1910, the vast majority of mankind living outside of

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Europe, in the colonies and dependencies of the European empires, had neither voice nor vote in policy decisions. Forty million lived in Britain in 1910. Four hundred million lived in the British empire. The essential policy decisions on which the well-being of the 40 million and the 400 million depended, were made at the summit of the British power hierarchy rather than by the British people. The 360 million non-British populating the British empire had neither voice nor vote in deciding empire policy.

Many changes occurred during the 19th century. The Turkish empire and the Chinese empire were dismembered and finally eliminated. The American empire and the Japanese empire moved toward major roles in the world power struggle. Arbitrary absolutisms were replaced by representative governments. But in 1910 the big tent of Western civilization was managed by a handful of humans who controlled production, wealth, policy-making, and guns.

The tiny segments of humanity which determined world policy in the opening years of the present century were in a position to decide the general direction of production and the spending of government incomes. In 1903 (for reasons that do not concern me at this point) they entered a competitive armament race that escalated steadily for the next eleven years, to 1914. This race for superiority in arms followed a race during the preceding decades for markets and colonies. Instead of getting together at the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907, agreeing upon a list of priorities, exploiting the colonial world collectively, and distributing the profits according to plan, the representatives of the big European empires decided to rearm and fight it out in the two general wars of survival in 1914-1918 and 1936-1945.

Two half-hearted efforts at order and peace were made: the League of Nations in 1919 and the United Nations in 1945. Neither succeeded because the big powers refused to set up a world government with sufficient delegated power to maintain world order and keep the peace. Neither the League of Nations nor the United Nations had the authority or the means of mak-

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ing and enforcing decisions. The big powers, holding the wealth and the armed forces, were their own lawmakers and law enforcers, sovereign masters inside their own frontiers. At the planetary level they were preparing to fight it out when the appropriate moment arrived.

Survival wars result in victory and defeat, but they are horribly destructive of life and wealth. Oligarchies spend life freely, until the people rebel. Spending in excess of income eventually leads to bankruptcy under any system of accounting. By 1945 every one of the European imperial nations was bankrupt. One measure of this bankruptcy was the revolutions in 1917 and 1918. Another measure was the economic collapse following 1928. A third measure was the economic and political prostration of Britain, France, and Germany in 1945.

For a hundred years the European masters of world economy and society had held in their hands the destiny of mankind. They had chosen to compete rather than to cooperate. They had chosen military preparedness rather than peaceful coexistence. They had chosen war rather than peace. They played the game of power politics with their eyes wide open. The outcome of the game was the collapse of the entire power structure.

War gutted and bankrupted the European centers of all the world empires. War led to mass revolution in Russia, Germany, and Austria-Hungary. War opened the door of independence and self-determination to the colonial and dependent peoples of Asia and Africa.

Empire policy makers aimed at wealth and power, not peace. They decided to subordinate civil authority to military might. They by-passed their common interests and chose to settle their differences at gun point. Instead of using science and technology to organize an affluent world society they established a series of warfare states and turned policy making over to the professional destroyers—the military.

The outcome—a foregone conclusion—was The Great War, fought with maximum destructivity and resulting in the collapse of capitalist imperialism.

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Next Step in China

In a previous World Events column I surveyed *Peking Review* and other Chinese publications in English. My conclusion: emphasis has shifted during the past two years from the Chinese people to one Chinese, Mao Tse-tung. Today's mail reports the next step. China's official news agency Hsinhua, in its *Selected News Items* for October 16, 1967, calls front-cover attention to a statement in *Red Flag,* theoretical journal of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, under the headline: "A Great Revolution to Achieve the Complete Ascendancy of Mao Tse-tung's Thought."

Until very recently Chinese publications have laid stress on the Cultural Revolution as an essential step which the Chinese people and the people of the whole world must take if they are to liberate themselves from the clutches of American imperialism. Lately emphasis has been shifting from the Cultural Revolution to Mao Tse-tung. Now there is a shift from Mao as an individual to the complete ascendancy of his thought and word.

One of the latest reports that I have read from China notes that Chinese youth is being taught to accept Mao's words as gospel, which they learn by heart, recite, and sing together. Mao's followers, it said, would no more question his word than a devout Christian in the West would question the word of God. This process of sanctifying and deifying Mao Tse-tung has been under way for some time. K.S. Karol, in his *China: the Other Communism* (New York, 1967) treats the matter at some length in a section "The Birth of a Heresy." He quotes a member of the Russian Communist Party (un-named), describing Mao's speech to Chinese students in Moscow University in 1957: "It was not a man who spoke, but a god who deigned to reveal a few truths to simple mortals." The following day, says Karol, the newspaper *Jenmin Jih Pao* reported the meeting: "While he spoke, a few specks of dust fell from the sleeve of his tunic, and hnceforth this rostrum at the University of Moscow will be cherished by all humanity."

Through the means of such adulation it seems that Mao, his worshippers, stage managers, press agents, aim to achieve "the complete world ascendancy of Mao Tse-tung's thought."

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(Continued from inside front cover)

the end of the war and his departure from Cuba in the spring of 1965. The book will be distributed by Grove Press, but MR readers can order from us in the usual way. On publication in February the list price will be $6.95. In the meantime, the prepub price to MR readers is $5.00. And Associates of course get 50 percent off as always. Since receiving the news of Che's death we have done everything possible to speed up the production process, and books should be ready for mailing out soon after this issue reaches you. In our opinion this book belongs in every MR reader's library.

It is a pleasure for us to announce that discussions initiated last summer with a group of Italian friends have borne fruit in a decision on their part to publish an Italian edition of MR. As their first number they chose the November issue commemorating the 50th anniversary of the October Revolution, and it may already be in print as we write these lines. In next month's issue we will include information about sub prices, the Rome address, etc. Our arrangement with the Italian group is identical to that with our friends in Chile who publish the Spanish edition. Only material which has actually appeared in the English edition or which has been expressly approved by us can be included in the foreign-language editions. But within this framework the local editors have freedom to select from current and past MR's the material they believe to be of greatest interest to their readerships.

In this issue we publish an article by one of us entitled "How to Spread the Word," dealing with the too much neglected subject of effective teaching on the Left. The other of us insists on including here a very brief, and in present circumstances poignant, tribute to the author. When we were in Cuba in 1960, Che gave us each a copy of the just-published Vol. I, No. 1 of *Verde Olivo,* organ of the Cuban rebel army. On one copy there was this inscription: "To Leo Huberman, who carries out Fidel's Number One precept, 'We must be clear,' this little revolutionary gift. Che." The article in this issue is designed to help others carry out Fidel's precept too.

We acknowledge with thanks receipt of a bequest of $300, willed to MR by the late Irving H. Flamm. Mr. Flamm was a charter subscriber to MR and a long-time Associate who took this means to help maintain MR as a truly independent socialist magazine. Any reader who may be moved to follow Irving Flamm's example should be careful to state exactly in his or her will that the bequest is to "Monthly Review, Inc., of 116 West 14th Street, New York, N.Y. 10011."

A sociology professor writes: "I trust that affairs at MR are going well. MR has certainly had its influence among the new Left students. It remains one of the finest publications I have ever seen. Wouldn't there be some possibility of expanding its size, now especially with the upsurge in some kind of leftist orientation?" The answer is yes, we want to expand, especially in the book review department. But we have to proceed cautiously in order to avoid taking on unsustainable financial obligations. What we need most of all to make expansion possible is more subs. You, the readers, have brought in most of our subs in the past. The time is ripe for a general push to bring in new ones—one very dear friend has just sent in *189 gift subs* at the special prices now available until December 31 (see back cover for details). Will you send in one-tenth as many? Ten? Five?

Best season's greetings.

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